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They suspended my account, took my email server down with it, then told me to read the email they sent me

2026-08-04 · Account suspension

On August 4th, 2026, AWS suspended one of my accounts. That account ran my mail server, which is the MX target for every domain I own.

202 domains lost email at once.

Then AWS told me what to do about it. By email. To the mailbox they had just taken offline.

The part that should not be possible

Read the sequence slowly, because it is genuinely circular:

  1. AWS suspends the account.
  2. The suspension takes down the mail server.
  3. AWS sends notice of the suspension by email.
  4. The notice explains that to reactivate, I should read the email they sent.
  5. I cannot read email. They are the reason I cannot read email.

This is not an edge case anyone failed to anticipate. It is the single most predictable failure mode of "notify the customer by email" and it took me about four seconds to hit it.

There was no way out from the inside

The obvious move is to fix the billing problem. I could not:

  • I could not add another payment method. The account is suspended, so the billing console will not take one.
  • I could not upgrade my support plan. Buying support requires an account that is not suspended. The thing that would let me talk to a human was gated behind the thing that was broken.
  • Support never answered.

So the escalation path was: pay us to talk to us, except you cannot pay us, because we suspended you, and we told you about it somewhere you cannot look.

What actually saved it: I own my DNS

Recovery took about 20 minutes, and AWS had nothing to do with it.

The MX records for all 202 domains live in Cloudflare, under an API token I control. Repointing them is a scripted operation I can run myself, at 2am, on a weekend, without opening a ticket or waiting for anyone's approval. So I stood up a new mail server on GCP and repointed.

Here is the state mid-incident, measured rather than assumed:

CheckResult
Active zones affected202
MX for the domains10 mail.[redacted]
That host resolves toa new IP, outside AWS
whois on that IPGoogle LLC — the rebuild, already live
TCP/25Open: 220 mail.[redacted] ESMTP
RCPT TO:<me@[redacted]>250 2.1.5 recipient ok

That last line is the one that mattered. Twenty minutes after the suspension, inbound mail for every domain was being accepted again. No mail was lost.

Not because of a backup. Not because of a runbook. Not because of a support contract. Because the DNS was mine.

The lesson, stated plainly

Own your DNS, or you do not own your recovery.

Three things follow from that, and all three are worth acting on before you need them:

  • Never let the mailbox that receives provider notices depend on that provider. AWS's suspension notice was undeliverable by construction. Yours will be too, if your mail lives where your account lives.
  • A support plan is not a recovery path. When the account dies, your ability to buy support dies with it. Budget zero minutes of recovery time for vendor response, because zero is what you are going to get.
  • Concentration is the risk. One account suspension took down 202 domains. That is not a story about AWS's reliability. It is a story about how much I had let depend on a single account that someone else can switch off.

To be completely fair to AWS

I want to be precise, because precision is the whole point of this site.

I do not know why the account was suspended, and AWS never told me in a channel I could actually read. It may well have been something legitimate. That is not the complaint.

The complaint is that there was no path back. Not a slow path. Not an expensive path. No path. Every door out of the problem was locked behind the problem itself — and the key was mailed to a house they had just demolished.

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